ARBITRARINESS AND THE DEATH
PENALTY IN AN INTERNATIONAL
CONTEXT
MARY K. NEWCOMER
It is virtually self-evident to me now that no combination of
procedural rules or substantive regulations ever can save the
death penalty from its inherent constitutional deficiencies. The
basic question-does the system accurately and consistently determine which defendants "deserve" to die?-cannot be answered in
the affirmative .... The problem is that the inevitability of factual, legal, and moral error gives us a system that we know must
wrongly kill some defendants, a system that fails to deliver the
fair, consistent, and reliable sentences of death required by the
Constitution.'
INTRODUCrION

In 1994, Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun repudiated
his past support for the death penalty' and declared that he could
"no longer.., tinker with the machinery of death."3 Justice
Blackmun stated that his experience with the administration of the
death penalty in the United States finally had led him to realize
that the Supreme Court's efforts to provide substantive and procedural safeguards to ensure "fairness, reasonable consistency, and
absence of error"4 in the imposition of the death penalty are
doomed to failure. Thus, the death penalty simply "cannot be
administered in accord with our Constitution."5 Justice Blackmun
argued that the Supreme Court's jurisprudence under the Eighth
Amendment of the Constitution, which prohibits states from inflicting "cruel and unusual punishment,"' established two indis-

1. Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1130 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
2. See id. at 1130 n.1.
3. Id. at 1130.
4. Id. at 1129.
5. Id. at 1137.
6. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
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pensable but inconsistent requirements for the constitutional imposition of the death penalty. According to Furman v. Georgia7 and
its progeny,8 the death penalty must be administered "consistently
and rationally, [or] it may not be administered at all." 9 On the
other hand, under Woodson v. North Carolina" and Lockett v.
Ohio," the death penalty also must be administered fairly, based
on an individualized examination of the defendant and his
crime. 2 According to the Supreme Court, these requirements are
balanced appropriately when the class of defendants eligible for
the death penalty is narrowed according to "clear and objective
standards that provide specific and detailed guidance,"' 3 and
when the sentencer, as to the narrowed class of defendants, retains
the discretion to consider any mitigating factor relevant to the
defendant's character or crime. 4 According to Justice Blackmun,
however, "this approach ... simply reduces, rather then elimi-5
nates, the number of people subject to arbitrary sentencing."'
Ultimately, "the decision whether a human being should live or
die is so inherently subjective-rife with all of life's understandings, experiences, prejudices, and passions-that it inevitably 1defies
6
the rationality and consistency required by the Constitution.
At the time that he reached this conclusion, however, Justice
Blackmun was the only Supreme Court Justice willing to "admit
the futility" of the attempt to ensure the consistent and fair ad-

7.

408 U.S. 238 (1972).

8. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153 (1976).
9.

Callins, 114 S. Ct. at 1131 (citing Eddings, 455 U.S. at 112).

10. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
11. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).

12. See id. at 604 (plurality opinion) (holding that "the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments require that the sentencer ...

not be precluded from considering, as a

mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than
death") (emphasis omitted); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303 (plurality opinion) (holding that
North Carolina mandatory death penalty statute was unconstitutional because of its "failure to allow the particularized consideration of relevant aspects of the character and
record of each convicted defendant before [sentencing him to death]").
13. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (plurality opinion) (quoting Gregg,
428 U.S. at 198).
14. Calins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1134 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1134-35.
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ministration of the death penalty.17 Today, after Justice Blackmun's retirement, the full Court continues to presume that judges,

juries, and prosecutors, provided with statutory sentencing guidelines for the imposition of the death penalty, make fair and reliable sentencing decisions based on relevant characteristics of defendants' characters and crimes. 8 Yet statistical evidence19 and
human intuition,' both of which strongly suggest that death pen-

alty decisions in fact are influenced by numerous extralegal factors,
undermine the presumption that the death penalty can be adminis-

tered fairly and in accordance with the Constitution. Nonetheless,
such evidence has convinced neither the Supreme Court nor feder-

al and state legislatures to abandon the use of a punishment that
is demonstrably inconsistent with the command of the Constitution.2 '

17. Id. at 1137.
18. See, e.g., Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 749 (1990) ("[S]tate appellate
courts can and do give each defendant an individualized and reliable sentencing determination based on the defendant's circumstances, his background, and the crime.");
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987) ("Because discretion is essential to the
criminal justice process, we would demand exceptionally clear proof before we would
infer that the discretion has been abused.").
19. See, e.g., McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286-87 (summarizing a sophisticated and comprehensive statistical study of Georgia death penalty decisions demonstrating a significant
disparity in the imposition of the death penalty based on the race of the victim and, to a
lesser extent, the race of the defendant); William J. Bowers, The Pervasiveness of Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1067 (1983) (presenting extensive evidence of extralegal influences on death
penalty decisions and demonstrating inherent arbitrariness in administration of death penalty).
20. See supra text accompanying note 16.
21. One commentator concluded, after surveying the use by Supreme Court Justices
of empirical social science evidence regarding the practical application of the death penalty, that
[r]esearch studies almost invariably have produced evidence that is inconsistent
with the premises that the death penalty is administered evenhandedly and that
capital punishment is effective or necessary to serve deterrence and incapacitation objectives. Justices writing lead opinions frequently have professed uncertainty and indifference about empirical evidence concerning the practical operation of death penalty systems, have adopted principles of adjudication that make
social fact propositions subsidiary or irrelevant to governing decisional premises,
and have proclaimed incompetence to scrutinize basic facts about capital punishment administration.
James R. Acker, A Different Agenda: The Supreme Court, Empirical Research Evidence,
and Capital Punishment Decisions, 1986-1989, 27 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 65, 81 (1993) (citations omitted). For examples of increasing legislative support for the death penalty, see
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§
60003-60024, 108 Stat. 1796, 1968-82 (1994) (to be codified in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.) (increasing the number of federal crimes for which the death penalty may be
imposed); Death Penalty, 1995 N.Y. Laws ch. 1 (McKinney) (reinstating death penalty in
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This Note demonstrates the inevitable arbitrariness of the
administration of the death penalty, and thus its inconsistency with
the Constitution's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, in a new context. It does not, as have many prior arguments
against the death penalty,' rely on empirical evidence of discrepancies in capital sentencing decisions. Instead, it provides a concrete example of how extrinsic forces-in this case, the international human rights obligations of States' with which the United
States has extradition agreements-bear on death penalty decisions
in the United States. The Note asserts that the influence of these
extrinsic factors makes the death penalty arbitrary because the
penalty is imposed in an international context in which circumstances unrelated to a defendant's character or crime can affect
the outcome of death penalty decisions. In fact, the Note argues
that both components of the procedural requirements for the constitutional imposition of the death penalty are violated. Finally, the
Note concludes that the death penalty is not only arbitrary as
administered within the existing international context, but within
other contexts as well. Death penalty sentencing schemes operate
within many environments-social, political, and economic-in
addition to the international political system described herein.
Although the influence on death penalty decisions of extrinsic
factors in those additional contexts is less amenable to concrete
demonstration than the influence exerted in the international context, this Note asserts that the influence of extrinsic factors is,
nonetheless, equally unavoidable.
Part I summarizes the Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence under the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, focusing
particularly on the procedural requirements the Court has established in an effort to prevent the arbitrary and capricious administration of the death penalty. Part II then describes four international cases that provide a framework for analyzing States' international human rights obligations with respect to extradition to the

New York); John Sanko, Lawyers Back Air Tests, Toughen the Death Penalty, ROCKY

MT. NEWS, Jan. 29, 1995, at 38A (discussing Colorado law passed to strengthen the death
penalty by giving sentencing authority to judges, and backed by some voters on the
ground that it is "too easy" for defense attorneys to find one juror opposed to the death
penalty).
22.

See supra note 19.

23. Throughout this Note, "State" with a capital "S" will refer to a foreign nation,
and "state" with a lower-case "s" will refer to a state within the United States.
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United States of individuals likely to face the death penalty. Part
III proposes that the influence of those human rights obligations

on the outcome of death penalty decisions in the United States
renders the administration of the death penalty arbitrary and capricious. Finally, the Note concludes by analogizing the international extradition cases to other extrinsic environmental factors,
thus providing a framework for understanding the inevitable and
pervasive influence of extrinsic factors on all death penalty decisions.
I. ARBITRARINESS AND THE DEATH PENALTY
IN THE UNITED STATES

The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution provides that
"cruel and unusual punishments [shall not be] inflicted."24 Although the Supreme Court has never held that punishment by
death is per se "cruel and unusual punishment,"' it has recognized that the death penalty is unique because of its severity and
irrevocability 6 Given the severe nature of the penalty, the Court
has required that extraordinary procedural safeguards accompany
its administration, because such a severe penalty will be cruel and
2
unusual if administered in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
The Court first announced the principle that the death penalty
may be imposed only if it is administered fairly and nonarbitrarily
in the case of Furman v. Georgia. The Court held 2 that the

24. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Although the Supreme Court has never defined clearly
what is meant by the phrase "cruel and unusual punishments," it has held that a punishment is "cruel and unusual" if it clearly is disproportionate to the offense for which it is
imposed, see Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962); Weems v. United States,
217 U.S. 349, 366-67 (1910), or if it is so inappropriate or physically or mentally painful
that it violates the "dignity of man." See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958); Weerms,
217 U.S. at 366.
25. See In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) (holding that punishment by death
is not cruel unless the method of execution is inhuman or barbarous).
26. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 309-10.
28. Five justices concurred with the judgment that the penalty as imposed was cruel
and unusual. However, because the Justices differed in their reasons for supporting the
judgment, only the opinions of Justices Stewart and White, who concurred on the most
narrow grounds, represent the opinion of the Court. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
169 n.15 (1976) ("[T]he holding of the Court [is] . . . that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds."); see also MARK
TUSHNET, THE DEATH PENALTY 48 (1994) (summarizing grounds on which the five
Justices concurred).
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death penalty as administered in the United States at that time
was cruel and unusual, and thus unconstitutional, because it was
"wantonly and ...

freakishly imposed"29 upon "a capriciously

selected random handful" of convicted criminals."
Four years after Furman, the Supreme Court revisited the
issue of arbitrariness and the death penalty in Gregg v. Georgia,
and indicated that the inclusion of certain procedural safeguards in
death penalty sentencing schemes could eliminate unconstitutional
arbitrariness from the imposition of the penalty.31 In Gregg, the
Court held that the Georgia death penalty statute, which was
revised after Furman to include sentencing guidelines and judicial
review provisions designed to prevent the arbitrary imposition of
the death penalty, was constitutional. 2 The revised statute 33 provided that all capital trials must proceed in two stages. In the first
stage, the jury determined the defendant's guilt or innocence.' If
the jury convicted the defendant, the trial proceeded to the penalty stage. During the penalty stage, the jury considered additional
evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, 35 and based
its sentencing decision on consideration of all the circumstances
presented. The jury could not, however, sentence the defendant to
death unless it affirmatively found, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that at least one of ten aggravating circumstances enumerated in
the statute was present.36 If the jury sentenced the defendant to
29.

Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).

30. Id. at 309-310; see also id. at 311-12 (White, J.,concurring) (finding the death
penalty cruel and unusual because it was imposed too infrequently to serve any legiti-

mate retributive or deterrent function in society); id. at 274 (Brennan, J.,concurring)
(arguing that "the State does not respect human dignity when, without reason, it inflicts
upon some people a severe punishment that it does not inflict upon others"); id. at
364-65 (Marshall, J.,concurring) (citing statistical evidence that the death penalty is
disproportionately imposed on racial minorities, the poor, and the disadvantaged to support his argument that the death penalty is cruel and unusual).
31. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
32. Id. at 206-07.

33. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 27-2534.1, -2537 (Harrison 1978). The current statute,
which is substantially the same as that considered in Gregg, is codified at GA. CODE

ANN. §§ 17-10-30 to -31, -35 (Michie 1990).
34.
35.

Gregg, 428 U.S. at 163.
Id. at 163-64. At the penalty stage, the strict evidentiary rules applicable to the

guilt stage do not apply. Id. at 164.
36. Id. at 164-65. The aggravating circumstances enumerated in the statute were:
(1) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed

by a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony[, or the offense of murder was committed by a person who has a substantial history of
serious assaultive criminal convictions].
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death, the decision automatically was appealed to the state supreme court, which was required to review the decision to determine
(1) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, and
(2) Whether... the evidence supports the jury's or judge's finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance as enumerated...
and
(3) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the
crime and the defendant. 37
After reiterating the principle that punishment by death is not
unconstitutional per se,38 the Court considered the constitutionality of the death penalty as administered under the Georgia statute.
The Court stated that Furman had established the principle that
(2) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed
while the offender was engaged in the commission of another capital felony, or
aggravated battery, or the offense of murder was committed while the offender
was engaged in the commission of burglary or arson in the first degree.
(3) The offender by his act of murder, armed robbery, or kidnapping knowingly
created a great risk of death to more than one person in a public place by
means of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives
of more than one person.
(4) The offender committed the offense of murder for himself or another, for
the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value.
(5) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, district attorney or
solicitor or former district attorney or solicitor during or because of the exercise
of his official duty.
(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or committed
murder as an agent or employee of another person.
(7) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of
mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim.
(8) The offense of murder was committed against any peace officer, corrections
employee or fireman while engaged in the performance of his official duties.
(9) The offense of murder was committed by a person in, or who has escaped
from, the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confinement.
(10) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with,
or preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement, of
himself or another.
GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b) (Harrison Supp. 1975) (quoted in Gregg, 428 U.S. at 165
n.9). The current death penalty statute, codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b)
(Michie 1990), lists identical aggravating circumstances, except that the bracketed ([ ])
portion of (1) was deleted after it was found to be unconstitutionally vague. See Arnold
v. State, 224 S.E.2d 386, 391-92 (Ga. 1976).
37. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537 (Harrison Supp. 1975) (quoted in Gregg, 428 U.S. at
166--67); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-35(c) (Michie 1990) (using same language).
38. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187.
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the death penalty "[can]not be imposed under sentencing procedures that create[] a substantial risk that it [will] be inflicted in an
arbitrary and capricious manner."39 The Court then held that the
Georgia statute did not create such a risk because it provided two
mechanisms to ensure that the death penalty would not be administered arbitrarily. First, the statute narrowed the crimes for which
the death penalty could be imposed and provided guidance to
jurors in making the sentencing decision.' The Court found that
[the statutory enumeration of aggravating circumstances and the
requirement that the jury consider all appropriate aggravating
and mitigating circumstances] require the jury to consider the
circumstances of the crime and the criminal before it recommends sentence .... [T]he jury's attention is directed to the specific circumstances of the crime . . . [and] is focused on the characteristics of the person who committed the crime .... As a resuit, while some jury discretion still exists, "the discretion to be
exercised is controlled by clear and objective standards so as to
produce non-discriminatory application."41
Second, the statute provided for state supreme court review of all
death sentences to ensure that none had been imposed arbitrarily
or was disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases.42
The Court also held that the discretion exercised by the prosecutor
in deciding whether or not to bring a capital charge, and by the
state governor or Board of Pardons and Paroles in deciding
whether or not to pardon a defendant, did not create a "substantial risk" of arbitrary or capricious decisionmaking. The Court
assumed that such actors in the criminal justice system would
apply essentially the same standards as those enumerated for the
jury, and the exercise of discretion thus would not be arbitrary.43
In Gregg v. Georgia, the Supreme Court accepted the principle that a system of procedural safeguards could serve as an effective mechanism to eradicate arbitrariness from the administration
of the death penalty. Subsequent cases clarified the specific procedural safeguards necessary to effectuate that eradication. As Justice Blackmun noted in Callins v. Collins, these procedural re-

39. Id. at 188.
40. Id. at 196-98.
41.

Ld. at 197-98 (quoting Coley v. State, 204 S.E.2d 612, 615 (Ga. 1974)).

42. Id. at 198.
43. See id. at 199; see also iU at 225 (White, J., concurring).
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quirements generally have proceeded along two lines.' First, procedures must be provided to ensure that the death penalty is ad45
ministered in an "evenhanded, rational, and consistent" manner.

To satisfy this requirement, death penalty statutes must provide
clear and objective standards that narrow the class of defendants

upon whom the sentencing authority may impose the death penalty.'

Death penalty sentencing procedures also must provide for

statewide judicial review of death sentences to ensure fairness and
consistency in the administration of the penalty.47 State courts do
not need to satisfy themselves that each death sentence is directly

proportionate to punishments received by similar defendants for
similar crimes.' However, the Court has suggested that some au-

tomatic appeal to a court with statewide jurisdiction must be provided to ensure that all sentences are reviewed for general consis-

tency with state sentencing patterns.49

44. See Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1136-37 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (summarizing procedural requirements and arguing that because
the two requirements cannot simultaneously be guaranteed, the death penalty can never
be administered in accord with the Constitution).
45. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) ("By providing prompt judicial
review of the jury's decision in a court with statewide jurisdiction, Texas has provided a
means to promote the evenhanded, rational, and consistent imposition of death sentences
under law.") (quoted in Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 48-49 (1984), which held that direct proportionality review is not required by the Constitution, but implied that some
automatic appeal is necessary to ensure that death penalty sentences are reviewed for
fairness and consistency).
46. See, e.g., Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774 (1990) (reaffirming principle that
death penalty sentencing scheme must direct and limit sentencer's discretion); Zant v.
Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 (1983) (holding that statutory aggravating circumstances perform "constitutionally necessary function" of narrowing class of death-eligible defendants);
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (plurality opinion) (holding that death penalty scheme must "channel the sentencer's discretion by clear and objective standards that
provide specific and detailed guidance") (quoted in Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. 1534,
1540 (1993)). But see Arave, 113 S. Ct. at 1550 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that
majority provided its own meaning to unconstitutionally vague aggravating factor in
Idaho's death penalty statute in order to avoid a finding of unconstitutionality).
47. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 48-49 (1984) (citing Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S.
262, 276 (1976)).
48. Pulley, 465 U.S. at 48.
49. MdLat 44 ("All of the new statutes [upheld in the post-Furman cases of Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), and Jurek v. Texas,
428 U.S. 262 (1976)] provide for automatic appeal of death sentences."); id. at 49
("[R]eferences to appellate review ...
were focused not on proportionality review as
such, but only on the provision of some sort of prompt and automatic appellate review.").
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Second, the Court has held that procedural safeguards must
ensure that the death penalty is administered fairly and based on
"consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense."5 ° In accordance with the requirement, sentencing authorities must be
permitted to consider "any aspect of the defendant's character or
record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers" in mitigation.5 Furthermore, not only must sentencers be allowed to consider any aspect of the defendant's character
and the circumstances of the crime, but they may only consider
aspects of the defendant's character and crime in deciding whether
or not to impose the death penalty. 2
In sum, the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence holds that the death penalty is unconstitutional if administered in an arbitrary and capricious manner. However, if procedural safeguards are provided to ensure the evenhanded and rational
imposition of the death penalty upon consideration of all-and
only-the circumstances of the defendant's character and crime,
the Court will hold the death penalty scheme constitutional. Conversely, a death penalty scheme will be unconstitutional if it does
not provide for the evenhanded and consistent imposition of the
death penalty, or if it permits death penalty decisions to be made
on the basis of factors other than the character of the defendant
or the characteristics of the crime.
II.

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS AND
EXTRADITION TO FACE THE DEATH PENALTY

The continued imposition of the death penalty in the United
States distinguishes this country from much of the international
community. In recent years, international condemnation of the
50. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982) (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)).
51. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-05 (1978).
52. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502 (1987) (holding that victim impact
evidence is per se inadmissible in a capital sentencing proceeding because it is not related to the defendant's character or crime). Although the Supreme Court explicitly overruled Booth with regard to the admissibility of victim impact evidence in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828-30 (1991), it did so on the ground that victim impact evidence
may provide relevant information regarding a defendant's crime by clarifying the degree
of harm caused by the crime. Payne, 501 U.S. at 819. Thus, Payne did not alter the
principle that only evidence relating to a defendant's character or crime is relevant to the
decision regarding the imposition of the death penalty.
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death penalty as a form of punishment has been reflected in the

decisions of a number of multinational human rights organizations.
Before discussing the specific decisions, a brief description of the

multinational human rights institutions that produced them may be
helpful.

During the years after World War II, a strong international
movement emerged, arguing for increased accountability for governments that violate the human rights of their citizens.53 This
movement ultimately led to the formation of several international
and regional treaties that obligated ratifying States, sometimes
called "Contracting Parties," to respect certain basic rights of their
citizens. Among these new treaties were the International Cove-

nant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which was drafted and
passed by the General Assembly of the United Nations and is
open for ratification or accession5 4 to all members of the United
Nations,55 and the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Con-

vention), 6 which was drafted by the Council of Europe, an organization of thirty-eight European States.

To ensure the accountability of States that are party to international human rights treaties, most treaties provide for an en-

forcement body with the authority to review States' compliance

53. John P. Humphrey, The InternationalLaw of Human Rights in the Middle Twentieth Century, in THE PRESENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 75, 82-83 (Maarten Bos,
ed. 1973). Historically, although treaties and custom required States to respect certain
rights of aliens within their territories and allowed the State of which the alien was a
national to seek compensation for violations of those rights, States had no international
obligations with respect to the treatment of their own citizens. Id at 75-76.
54. An original signing party ratifies a treaty; later parties that did not sign the treaty may become obligated to its terms by accession. I OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW
§ 602, at 1226-27, § 611, at 1236-37 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed.
1992). The practical significance, namely that the treaty provisions become binding on the
ratifying or acceding party, is the same. 1d; see also Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 11, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 335-36 (entered into force Jan. 27,
1980), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679, 685 (1969).
55. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 21st
Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976)
[hereinafter ICCPR].
56. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter European
Convention]. Other regional agreements include the American Convention on Human
Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. T.S. No. 36 (entered into force July 18, 1978), and The
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, O.A.U. Doe.
CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5 (1981) (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986).
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with their obligations. The enforcement body for the ICCPR is the
United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC), which has
the authority to request and review reports on participating States'
compliance with the Covenant's provisions.' The UNHRC also
has the authority, when the State has accepted UNHRC jurisdiction through accession to the Optional Protocol, to review complaints brought by individuals alleging State violations of rights
guaranteed under the Covenant.58 After the UNHRC reviews an
individual complaint and any response by the State, it issues its
"views" regarding whether the State has violated the rights of the
complainant. 9 The "views" of the UNHRC are not binding on
the States party to the ICCPR and Optional Protocol, but they
generally are considered to be authoritative interpretations of the
Covenant, and may provide political ammunition for domestic and
international opposition to States' human rights violations.' In
addition, the Committee recently has adopted new measures, including the appointment of a "Special Rapporteur for 61the FollowUp of Views," to monitor compliance with its "views."
The enforcement mechanism of the European Convention is
both more complex and more effective than that of the ICCPR.
The European Convention established both a European Commission of Human Rights and a European Court of Human Rights to
enforce the provisions of the Convention. 62 Allegations that a
Contracting Party has violated its obligations under the Convention
may be submitted to the Commission by any other Contracting
Party,' or, if the Contracting Party has made a declaration recognizing the Commission's jurisdiction, by an individual, group of
individuals, or nongovernmental organization.' 4 The Commission
57. ICCPR, supra note 55, arts. 28, 40-42.
58. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N.
GAOR 3d Comm., 21st Sess. Supp., No. 16, at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (entered
into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter Optional Protocol].

59. Id. art. 5(4).
60. See JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTs 59 (1993) ("[United Nations] findings ... have a certain authority, even though they are not legally binding.
Domestic human rights NGOs [non-governmental organizations] and other opposition
groups may be able to draw support from UN reports and resolutions. International
NGOs and foreign governments may also use the findings.").
61. Sian Lewis-Anthony, Treaty-Based Procedures for Making Human Rights Complaints Within the UN System, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE
41, 48-49 (Hurst Hannum ed., 2d ed. 1992).

62. European Convention, supra note 56, art. 19.
63.

1d art. 24.

64.

ld.art. 25. At present, all Contracting Parties have accepted the right of individ-
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first attempts to secure a friendly settlement of matters referred to
it. If it is unsuccessful, it may refer a report on the matter to the
Committee of Ministers, which is composed of the Foreign Ministers of all member States of the Council of Europe. 6 Alternatively, the Commission or Contracting Party involved may refer the

matter to the European Court, as long as the Contracting Party
has declared its acceptance of the European Court's jurisdiction.'

The decisions of the European Court are binding on the Contracting Parties,'

and the European Court has the authority to "af-

ford just satisfaction to the injured party."6
In addition to increasing the accountability of States party to
international human rights treaties, treaty enforcement bodies play
an important role in interpreting and clarifying the meaning of the
often vague provisions of international human rights agreements.

The decisional law of the enforcement bodies, particularly the
European Court, provides States and individuals with clear notice

of the States' international human rights obligations. One area in
which this decisional law has played a significant role in clarifying
and expanding States' obligations is the field of international extradition.69 Recent decisions of the European Court and UNHRC

ual petition; in fact, such acceptance has become a de facto condition for admission to
the Council of Europe. Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 11 to the
European Convention on Human Rights, available in 15 HUM. RTS. L. 91, 98 (1994).
65. European Convention, supra note 56, arts. 28, 31.
66. ld.arts. 44, 46-47. Protocol No. 9 to the Convention granted a complaining party
the right to refer its case to the European Court. Protocol No. 9 to the Convention For
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 6, 1990, arts. 3, 5,
available in 30 I.L.M. 693, 694 (1991). In addition, a new protocol designed to
"restructur[e] the control machinery" of the European Convention would, inter alia, make
acceptance of the right of individual petition mandatory and allow an individual petitioner
to refer a case to the European Court. Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, May 11, 1994, art. 34, available in
15 HUM. RTS. LJ. 86, 88 (1994). For a discussion of the significant structural changes
proposed by Protocol No. 11, see Andrew Drzemczewski & Jens Meyer-Ladewig, Principal Characteristics of the New ECHR Control Mechanism, as Established by Protocol No.
11, Signed on 11 May 1994, 15 HUM. RTS. LJ.81 (1994).
67. European Convention, supra note 56, art. 53. The European Court submits its
judgments to the Committee of Ministers, which supervises their execution. Id. art. 54.
68. Id. art. 50.
69. International extradition is "a formal process by which a person is surrendered
by one state to another." 1 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITON: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 8 (2d ed. 1987). Generally, extradition between States is
governed by treaty. ld.at 10 ("The duty to extradite only by virtue of a treaty . . .has
become the prevalent practice among states."). Extradition treaties establish the procedures a State must follow when seeking extradition, and obligate a State holding a fugi-
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have held that States' human rights obligations extend not only to

their citizens but also to individuals within their jurisdictions who
are the subjects of extradition proceedings, regardless
the State seeking extradition is a party to the human
ty.70 The cases demonstrate a clear trend toward the
for many States of an obligation to refuse extradition

of whether
rights treaemergence
of an indi-

vidual who faces a significant risk of receiving the death penalty in
the receiving State unless the receiving State provides assurances
71
that the death penalty will not be imposed or carried out.
A. Soering v. United Kingdom

The plenary European Court of Human Rights unanimously
decided the seminal case of Soering v. United Kingdom72 in 1989.
Soering involved a challenge by Jens Soering, a young German
national, to his extradition by the United Kingdom to the United
73
States in order to face capital murder charges in Virginia.
Soering complained that if the United Kingdom extradited him, it
would be subjecting him to "inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment"'74 in violation of its obligations under Article 3 of
the European Convention, which provides that "[n]o one shall be
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment."7' 5 Soering argued that if he was extradited, he likely
would be sentenced to death, 76 and would face prolonged detentive to extradite upon satisfaction of those procedures, subject to certain exceptions. See,
e-g., Model Treaty on Extradition, U.N. GAOR 45th Sess., Agenda Item 100, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/45/116 (1990), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1407 (1991). This Note will refer to the State
seeking extradition as the "receiving State" and the State from which extradition is
sought as the "harboring State."
70. See infra note 79 and accompanying text; text accompanying notes 135-36.
71. See infra text accompanying notes 155-59.
72. 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1063 (1989).
73. Soering, 28 I.L.M. at 1071.
74. Id. at 1089.
75. European Convention, supra note 56, art. 3.
76. Article IV of the Extradition Treaty between the United Kingdom and the United States provides that "[i]f the offense for which extradition is requested is punishable
by death under the relevant law of the requesting Party, but the relevant law of the
requested Party does not provide for the death penalty in a similar case, extradition may
be refused unless the requesting Party gives assurances satisfactory to the requested Party
that the death penalty will not be carried out." Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, U.S.U.K., art. IV, 28 U.S.T. 227, 230. In accordance with Article IV, the United Kingdom
had requested an assurance from the United States that Soering would not be subject to
the death penalty. Soering, 28 I.L.M. at 1073. The Virginia prosecutor had agreed that if
Soering were convicted of capital murder, he would inform the sentencing judge that "it
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tion on death row in severe conditions that would constitute inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment. 7
The European Court held that, under the circumstances of the
case, the extradition of Soering to face the serious likelihood of a
death sentence in the United States would constitute a violation of
Article 3 of the European Convention.78 In a sweeping declaration of the scope of a Contracting State's obligations under the
Convention, the European Court held that
the decision by a Contracting State to extradite a fugitive may
give rise to an issue under Article 3, and hence engage the responsibility of the State under the Convention, where substantial
grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if extradited, faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the
requesting country .... In so far as any liability under the Convention is or may be incurred, it is liability incurred by the extraditing Contracting State by reason of its having taken action
which has as a direct consequence the exposure of an individual
to proscribed ill-treatment. 79
The European Court based this principle on the Contracting
State's obligation to ensure that all those within its jurisdiction
receive the practical and effective protections provided by the Convention. 0

is the wish of the United Kingdom that the death penalty should not be imposed or
carried out." Soering argued, however, that this assurance was "worthless." Id. at
1073-74. The European Court agreed that the "assurance" did not eliminate the likelihood of Soering's being sentenced to death. Id at 1095.
77. Soering, 28 I.L.M. at 1088.
78. Id.at 1100-01.
79. Id. at 1093. This principle was not, in fact, new to the Soering case. Earlier decisions of the European Commission had indicated that, in certain extraordinary circumstances, extradition of an individual to face conditions proscribed by the Convention
might invoke the responsibility of the extraditing state under the Convention. See
Kirkwood v. U.K., App. No. 10479/83, 37 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 158, 182-83
(1984); Altun v. F.R.G., App. No. 10308/83, 36 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 209,
231-32 (1984). However, Soering was the first case in which the European Court embraced this principle.
80. See European Convention, supra note 56, art. 1, at 224 ("The High Contracting
Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined
in Section I of this Convention."); see also Artico v. Italy, 37 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1980), reprinted in 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 13 (1981) (holding that defendant's right to
counsel must be effective, not merely theoretical or illusory).
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Applying the stated principle to extradition to face the death
penalty, the European Court held that, although subjecting an
individual to the death penalty per se did not constitute a violation of the provisions of Article 3,1 the circumstances of detention on death row-the "death row phenomenon"--could reach
the level of "inhuman" punishment prohibited by Article 3.' The
European Court cited four circumstances that supported its ruling
that the extradition of Soering without a concrete assurance that

the death penalty would not be imposed would violate Article 3:
(1) the length of detention on death row prior to execution-an
average six to eight years in Virginia;83 (2) the conditions on
death row, including a severe custodial regime and the risk of
homosexual abuse and physical attack;' (3) Soering's youthful
age and possibly disturbed mental state at the time of the murders;' and (4) the possibility that Soering could be extradited to
face charges in the Federal Republic of Germany, which eliminated the possibility that he might elude justice if not extradited.'6
81. Soering, 28 I.L.M. at 1097.
82. Id. at 1098, 1100-01.
83. Id. at 1098. The European Court held that the length of detention can contribute
to inhuman conditions even if the delay is due primarily to the appellate process and
habeas corpus proceedings initiated by the prisoner. Id. This view is consistent with recent decisions by the Privy Council of the United Kingdom, Pratt v. Attorney General
for Jamaica, [1994] 2 App. Cas. 1, 33 (P.C. 1993) (appeal taken from Jam.) ("If the
appellate procedure enables the prisoner to prolong the appellate hearings over a period
of years, the fault is to be attributed to the appellate system that permits such delay and
not to the prisoner who takes advantage of it."); the Supreme Court of India,
Vatheeswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 348, 353 (India) ("The cause of
the delay is immaterial when the sentence is death. Be the cause for the delay, the time
necessary for appeal and consideration of reprieve or some other cause for which the accused himself may be responsible, it would not alter the dehumanizing character of the

delay."); and the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, Catholic Commission for Justice and
Peace in Zimbabwe v. Attorney-General, Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, unreported, available in 14 HuM. RTS. L.J. 323, 334 (1993) ("It seems to me highly artificial and unrealistic to discount the mental agony and torment experienced on death row on the basis that
by not making the maximum use of the judicial process available the condemned prisoner
would have shortened and not lengthened his suffering.") (quoted in Pratt, [1994] 2 App.
Cas. at 31).
84. Soering, 28 I.L.M. at 1099.
85. Id. at 1099-1100.
86. Id. at 1100. The Federal Republic of Germany also had requested Soering's extradition because German criminal law provides for jurisdiction over German nationals
accused of crimes committed outside Germany. Id. at 1087. Because Germany abolished
the death penalty in 1949, Soering could have been prosecuted for the murder in Germany without the risk of receiving the death penalty. Id.
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The Soering decision is significant because it explicitly held
that the obligations of Contracting Parties to the European Convention apply to all persons within their jurisdictions, including
those who are the subjects of extradition proceedings, regardless of
whether the receiving State is also a Contracting Party to the Convention.' Thus, a Contracting Party may be obligated under the
European Convention to refuse extradition to the United States or
seek assurances that the death penalty will not be carried out
when extradition may ultimately lead to the imposition of the
death penalty.
The European Court also stated that the content of the Article 3 prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is determined by the evolving standards of the Contracting Parties.' According to this principle, as the Contracting Parties to the Convention move toward a uniform condemnation of the death penalty, 9
the European Court may find that the death penalty per se is
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in violation of
Article 3 of the Convention. Upon such a finding, all Contracting
Parties would be forbidden to extradite anyone within their jurisdictions to face the death penalty.
B. Short v. The Netherlands
In Short v. The Netherlands, the High Court of the Netherlands addressed a situation in which a Contracting Party to both
the European Convention and its Sixth Protocol, which requires a
Contracting Party to abolish the death penalty absolutely,9' received a request to extradite an individual to face the death penalty.9 ' Short involved a request by U.S. military authorities for the

87. ld. at 1091-92.
88. Id. at 1096-97.
89. As of December 31, 1993, 20 of the then 28 States party to the European Convention had ratified the Sixth Protocol to the Convention, AMNEsTY INTERNATIONAL
REPORT 351 (1994), which states: "The death penalty shall be abolished. No one shall be
condemned to such penalty or executed." Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the
Death Penalty, art. I, April 28, 1983, Europ. T.S. No. 114 (entered into force March 1,
1985), reprinted in 22 LL.M. 538 (1983) [hereinafter Sixth Protocol]. Only 14 States had
ratified the Protocol at the time of the Soering decision. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 290 (1990).
90. Sixth Protocol, supra note 89, art. 1.
91. Nos. 13.949, 13.950, excerpted and translated in 29 I.L.M. 1388 (1990). The decision excerpted is a summary decision. The court's reasoning discussed herein is that con-
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extradition of U.S. Staff Sergeant Charles Short in order to prosecute him for a murder he committed while stationed in the Netherlands. 2 After Dutch police arrested Short and he confessed to
the murder of his wife, the United States requested that Short be
extradited to U.S. military personnel pursuant to the NATO Status
of Forces Agreement (NATO SOFA) 93 to face court-martial for
capital murder.94 Although the United States refused to guarantee
that the death penalty would not be imposed on Short, the Dutch
State Secretary agreed to extradite Short.' Short appealed to the
High Court, arguing that if the Netherlands extradited him to face
court-martial for capital murder, it would commit a tort against
him by violating the fights it was obligated to afford him under
the European Convention and the Sixth Protocol.96
The High Court first ruled that the Netherlands was obligated
to secure to Short all the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the
European Convention because he was an individual within its
jurisdiction. 7 The High Court then considered precisely what
tained in the Opinion of Advocaat-Generaal Strikwerda, excerpted and translated in 29
LL.M. 1378 (1990), which was adopted by the court in its brief statement of the grounds
for its decision. Short, 29 I.L.M. at 1389.
92. Leonard H. W. van Sandick, The Netherlands: Opinion of the Advocaat-Generaal
and Supreme Court Decision in The Netherlands v. Short: Introductory Note, 29 I.L.M.
1375, 1375 (1990).
93. Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, 199 U.N.T.S. 67. The relevant provisions are
Art. VII, paragraph 3(a)(i): The military authorities of the sending State shall
have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over a member of a force . . .in
relation to . . . offenses solely against the person or property of .
a dependent [of a member of the force];
Art. VII, paragraph 5(a): The authorities of the receiving and sending States
shall assist each other in the arrest of members of a force or civilian component or their dependents in the territory of the receiving State and in handing
them over to the authority which is to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with
the . . .provisions [of the Article].
Id. at 1800, 199 U.N.T.S. at 78. Although the NATO SOFA agreement refers to the
process of transferring custody of prisoners as "handing over," the Short court held that
the distinction between "handing over" and "extradition" was irrelevant to the Netherlands obligations under the European Convention. Short, 29 I.L.M. at 1384 ("The essential point is whether the conduct of the State will have as a result that the person concerned will be exposed to the forbidden treatment, irrespective of the juridical qualification of the act of transmission."). Therefore, to avoid confusion, this Note will refer to
Short's "handing over" proceedings as extradition proceedings.
94. See 10 U.S.C. § 918 (1994).
95. Short, 29 I.L.M. at 1378.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1382; see also European Convention, supra note 56, art. 1 ("The High
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those rights and freedoms were. The High Court held that the
European Convention and Sixth Protocol, when read together,

obligated the Netherlands not to subject Short to the death penalty.9" The Netherlands, by ratifying the Sixth Protocol, had indicat-

ed that it "consider[ed] imposition and execution of the death
penalty inhuman treatment which art. 3 of the European Convention forbids." 99 In light of the Soering judgment, the Netherlands

could not extradite an individual to face such inhuman treatment:
[A] state which is a party to the Sixth Protocol and proceeds
with extradition for an act which is subject to the death penalty
under the legislation of the requesting State, acts in conflict with
art. 2 as well as art. 3 of the European Convention, if it can be
assumed on valid grounds that the requested person after extradition runs a real chance of being condemned to death and the
possibility that the death penalty will be executed on him is not
excluded.'

Thus, the High Court held that the Netherlands would commit a
tort against Short if it extradited him to the U.S. military authorities, and ordered that he not be extradited without a guar-

antee from the United States that the death penalty would not be
imposed on him.'0 '

Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedons defined in Section I of this Convention.").
98. Short, 29 I.L.M. at 1383.
99. Id
100. Id at 1384. Article 2 of the European Convention provides that "[n]o one shall
be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law." European
Convention, supra note 56, art. 2.
101. Id. The High Court also expressed regret that its decision might allow Short to
evade justice, and stated its hope that its decision would induce the United States to
grant the requested guarantee that the death penalty would not be imposed. Id at
1387-88. After the High Court's decision, the United States and Dutch authorities agreed
that Short, while technically remaining in Dutch custody, would submit to a pretrial investigation and psychiatric evaluation by U.S. military authorities, and would be extradited only if the U.S. court-martial decided not to prefer Short for a capital crime. Major
John E. Parkerson, Jr. & Major Carolyn S. Stoehr, The U.S. Military Death Penalty in
Europe: Threats From Recent European Human Rights Decisions, 129 MIL L. REV. 41,
72 n.174 (1990) (citing Telecommunications Message from AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
to SECSTATE Washington (U) (June 6, 1990), subject: SGT Short Murder Case: Psychiatric Evaluation: Status Report). The court-martial convening authority ultimately referred
Short's case as noncapital, and he was released to United States custody by Dutch authorities. See United States v. Short, ACM 29628, 1993 C.M.R. LEXIS 315, at *6

(A.F.C.M.R. 1993).
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The Short decision, although binding only in the Netherlands,
suggests the likely obligations of all Contracting Parties to both
the European Convention and the Sixth Protocol. The Dutch High
Court's analysis of the effect of ratification of the Sixth Protocol
on a Contracting Party's obligations under Article 3 of the European Convention is logical and consistent with the European
Court's Soering decision. The European Court declared in Soering
that a Contracting Party's obligations under Article 3 are dependent on evolving standards of what constitutes inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."° By ratifying the Sixth Protocol, a
Contracting Party declares that its standards have evolved to the
point where it considers the death penalty to be inhuman treatment and is willing to undertake a legal obligation to that effect. 3 A Contracting Party to the Sixth Protocol therefore is obligated not to subject anyone within its jurisdiction to the death
penalty. Under the Soering principle, that obligation applies to
individuals who are the subjects of extradition proceedings. Thus,
Contracting Parties to the European Convention and Sixth Protocol are obligated not to extradite anyone who faces a significant
risk of execution.
Admittedly, this obligation to refuse extradition raises the
possibility that Contracting Parties to the European Convention
and Sixth Protocol may become "safe havens" for capital crimij
nals. 1° However, the Soering and Short cases, which both resulted in the transfer of the fugitives to U.S. custody and assurances
by the United States that the death penalty would not be imposed,'0 5 suggest the more likely outcome of refusals to extradite:
The United States will, when necessary, provide assurances that
the death penalty will not be imposed; the fugitives will be extradited; and prosecutors will exercise their discretion to bring
noncapital charges against the extradited individuals. Thus, "safe
haven" concerns probably will not prompt the European Court or
Contracting Parties to the European Convention and Sixth Proto-

102.
I.L.M.
103.
104.
105.
(1991)

Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), reprinted in 28
1063, 1097 (1989).
See supra text accompanying note 99.
See Soering, 28 I.L.M. at 1092; see also Short, 29 I.L.M. at 1387.
See Richard B. LiUich, Comment, The Soering Case, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 128, 141
(describing U.S. assurances that no capital charges would be brought against

Soering); supra note 101.
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col to retreat from their understanding of their obligations with respect to extradition of individuals to face the death penalty.
C. Kindler v. Canada and Ng v. Canada
Despite the strong European commitment to human rights
obligations with respect to extradition to face the death penalty,
recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada and the United
Nations Human Rights Committee have limited the scope of the
Soering principle. However, the UNHRC decisions both reinforce
the principle that international human rights obligations apply to
extradition decisions and increase the likelihood that future Canadian extradition decisions will be influenced by international obligations.
Joseph Kindler was convicted of murder and kidnapping in
Pennsylvania, and the jury recommended that he be sentenced to
death. Prior to his sentencing, Kindler escaped from custody and
fled to Canada, where he was arrested. The United States requested his extradition, and extradition was ordered by the Superior
Court of Quebec."° Charles Chitat Ng also fled to Canada to
avoid prosecution for murder. He was arrested by Canadian authorities, and the United States requested that he be extradited to
California to face criminal charges for which he could receive the
death penalty."° A Canadian court ordered his extradition in
November 1988.
Pursuant to Article 6 of the Extradition Treaty between the
United States and Canada,' both Kindler and Ng petitioned the
Canadian Minister of Justice to request assurances from the Unit-

106. Kindler v. Canada, Comm. No. 470/1991, Views of the UN Human Rights Committee, adopted on 30 July 1993, 2.1, available in 14 HuM. RTS. L.J. 307 (1993) [hereinafter Kindler Views].
107. In re Ng Extradition, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 858, 863 (Cory, J., dissenting).
108. Treaty on Extradition, Dec. 3, 1971, Can.-U.S., Art. 6, 27 U.S.T. 983, 983.
When the offense for which extradition is requested is punishable by death
under the laws of the requesting State and the laws of the requested State do
not permit such punishment for that offense, extradition may be refused unless
the requesting State provides such assurances as the requested State considers
sufficient that the death penalty shall not be imposed, or, if imposed, shall not
be executed.
The Article is applicable because Canada abolished the death penalty for all but a few
military offenses in 1976. See Criminal Law Amendment (No.2), July 16, 1976, ch. 105., §
5, 1974-75-76 S.C. 2127, 2129-30 (Can.) (revising Canadian Criminal Code to eliminate
possibility of death sentence for murder).
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ed States that the death penalty would not be imposed on them.
The Minister of Justice denied both requests, primarily because he
feared that a routine practice of seeking assurances against the
imposition of the death penalty would encourage capital fugitives
from the United States to seek haven in Canada in order to reduce the severity of their punishments.' 9 Kindler and Ng both
petitioned the Supreme Court of Canada and the United Nations
Human Rights Committee to review the decisions of the Minister
of Justice.
In the cases before the Canadian Supreme Court, Kindler and
Ng both argued that the failure of the Minister of Justice to condition their extraditions to the United States on the receipt of assurances that the death penalty would not be imposed violated sections 7 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms."' These sections provide, respectively, that no person shall
be deprived of "life, liberty and security of the person ...

except

in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice," and that
"[e]veryone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and
unusual treatment or punishment." Kindler and Ng argued that (1)
the death penalty per se, (2) the particular method of execution,
and (3) the "death row phenomenon" created by prolonged detention on death row, constituted cruel and unusual treatment or
punishment to which they could not be subjected, through extradition, under section 12. They further argued that because the imposition of the death penalty did not accord with Canadian principles
of fundamental justice, extradition to face the penalty deprived
them of life and liberty in violation of section 7 of the Charter."'
The Canadian Supreme Court decided the Kindler and Ng
cases together. The Canadian Court ruled, in a strongly contested
4-3 decision, that extradition without assurances did not violate
the provisions of the Canadian Charter."' Justice La Forest,
writing for the majority, first held that the Minister's decision to

109. Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779, 796 (Cory, J., dissenting); Ng, [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 863-64 (Cory, J., dissenting).
110. Kindler, [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 780; Ng, [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 859. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, a part of the Constitution Act of 1982, is reproduced in 1
C.R.R. 1 (1982).
111. Kindler, [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 780-81.
112. 1d at 780; Ng, [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 859-60. The arguments supporting the Canadian Court's decisions are set forth in the Kindler opinion.
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extradite did not constitute cruel and unusual treatment or punishment in violation of section 12 of the Charter." 3 Because the
death penalty would, if imposed, be carried out by U.S. officials
within the United States against a U.S. citizen for a crime committed in the United States, the Minister of Justice could not be
held responsible for that action." 4
Turning to section 7, Justice La Forest held that the Kindler
and Ng extraditions would not violate Canadian principles of fundamental justice unless extradition would subject the petitioners to
conditions "so unacceptable as to 'shock the conscience"' of the
Canadian community." 5 Justice La Forest found that extradition
to face the death penalty would not "shock the conscience" of the
Canadian citizenry based on the following three factors: reinstatement of the death penalty had been voted down in 1987 by a
relatively narrow margin; public opinion statistics indicated that extradition to face the death penalty would not be an outrage to the
public conscience;" 6 and, despite the trend among Western nations, there was no customary norm of international law against
the death penalty." 7
Justice La Forest also echoed the Minister of Justice's desire
that the extradition of capital criminals to the United States remain unhindered by the Charter because of the threat that Canada
might become a safe haven for criminals who face the possibility
of a death sentence in the United States."' Finally, Justice La
Forest dismissed the arguments regarding the "death row phenomenon" and the method of execution, finding that those factors did
not raise the conditions of extradition over the "shock the conscience" threshold." 9

113. Kindler, [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 831.
114.

Id. This view of the responsibility of a harboring State for the subsequent treat-

ment of an extradited individual is directly opposed to the Soering principle.
115.

Id. at 832 (quoting Schmidt v. Canada, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500, 522).

116. Id.
117. Id. at 834.
118. Id. ("The Government has the right and duty to keep out and to expel aliens

from this country if it considers it advisable to do so .

.

. It would be strange if Cana-

da could expel lesser criminals but be obliged by the Charter to grant sanctuary to indi-

viduals who were wanted for crimes so serious as to call for the death penalty in their
country of origin.")
119. Id. at 838 (noting that delays on death row are due primarily to the voluntary
prosecution of appeals by the prisoners themselves, and that there may not be more
humane methods of execution than electrocution).
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The decision of the majority, however, was far from decisive.
Three justices dissented on two grounds. Justice Sopinka argued
that under section 7 of the Charter, extradition to face the death
penalty was contradictory to Canadian principles of fundamental
justice. He argued that principles of fundamental justice are violated whenever an individual is extradited to "face a situation that is
simply unacceptable."'2 ° Under this standard, Justice Sopinka
concluded that "it offends the principles of fundamental justice not
to seek assurances against the imposition of what would be a
violation of s. 12, were it carried out in Canada."'21 Finally, he
dismissed the "safe haven" argument on the ground that it was

not clear that fugitives would elude justice if assurances were
sought because the United States probably would provide assurances if extradition were conditioned on their issuance."z
Justice Cory dissented on the ground that section 12 of the
Charter prohibited extradition to face the death penalty. He argued that the death penalty clearly constituted cruel and unusual

punishment under section 12. Justice Cory then asserted that
the protections of section 12 applied even though the death penalty would be carried out in the United States. Justice Cory cited
Canadian authority 24 and the Soering judgment'2' to support
120. Id. at 791 (Sopinka, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Allard, [1987] 1
S.C.R. 564, 572) (emphasis added).
121. Id. at 792. Justice Sopinka assumed that the abolition of the death penalty in
Canada reflected a belief that the penalty is a cruel and unusual punishment prohibited
by section 12 of the Charter. lid
122. Id.; see also supra note 105 and accompanying text (providing empirical support
for Justice Sopinka's assumption).
123. Kindler, [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 813-15 (Cory, J., dissenting). Justice Cory cited the
Charter's emphasis on human dignity and the Court's interpretation of the "cruel and unusual punishment" clause to support his conclusion. He summarized the principles governing the interpretation of section 12:
First, punishments must never be grossly disproportionate to that which would
have been appropriate to punish, rehabilitate or deter the particular offender or
to protect the public from that offender. Second ....

punishments must not in

themselves be unacceptable no matter what the crime, no matter what the offender ....

[W]hen a punishment becomes so demeaning that all human digni-

ty is lost, then the punishment must be considered cruel and unusual.
Id. at 815 (citing R. v. Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045).
124. Id. at 819-20 (citing Schmidt v. Canada, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500, 522); Argentina v.
Meliino, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 536, 558; United States v. Allard, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 564, 572; Singh
v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177, 207 ("'[S]ecurity of the
person' [as used in section 7 of the Canadian Charter] must encompass freedom from the
threat of physical punishment or suffering as well as freedom from such punishment itself.")).
125. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), reprinted in 28
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his conclusion that "Canada has the obligation not to extradite a
person to face a cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. To
surrender a fugitive who may be subject to the death penalty
violates s. 12 of the Charter just as surely as would the execution
of the fugitive in Canada."'" Finally, Justice Cory dismissed the
"safe haven" argument on the ground that there was no evidentiary support for this "in terrorem argument."' 27
Canada's human fights obligations with respect to the Kindler
and Ng extraditions also were considered by the United Nations
Human Rights Committee (UNHRC). Canada is a party to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)m
and the Optional Protocol providing for the right of individual petition to the UNHRC.' 29 Pursuant to these treaties, Kindler and
Ng filed communications with the UNHRC seeking review of the
decisions of the Canadian Supreme Court. Kindler and Ng each
alleged that the decision to extradite him violated Article 6 (right
to life), Article 7 (prohibition against torture and cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment or punishment), Article 9 (right to liberty
and security of person), Article 10 (right of detained persons to be
treated with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of the
human person), Article 14 (right to a fair trial), and Article 26
(prohibition against discrimination under the law) of the ICCPR." ° Both argued that the conditions on death row constituted
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment, and that
racial bias in the imposition of the death penalty rendered the trial
leading to its imposition unfair.' Kindler further argued that the
death penalty per se constituted cruel, inhuman, and degrading
punishment, 3 2 and Ng argued that execution by gas asphyxiation
constituted cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment. 33

I.L.M. 1063 (1989).
126. Kindler, [1991] 2 S.C.R. at 824 (Cory, J., dissenting).
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 825-26.
ICCPR, supra note 55.
Optional Protocol, supra note 58, arts. 1, 2.

130. Kindler Views, supra note 106,
1; Ng v. Canada, Comm. No. 469/1991, Views
of the UN Human Rights Committee, adopted on 5 November 1993,
3 [hereinafter Ng
Views].

131.

Kindler Views, supra note 106,

3; Ng Views, supra note 130,

132.
133.

Kindler Views, supra note 106,
Ng Views, supra note 130, T 3.

3.

3.
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In both views, the Committee only considered Canada's obli1 In the Kindler
gations under Articles 6 and 7 of the ICCPR.M
views, the Committee adopted and reiterated the Soering principle:
[I]f a State party takes a decision relating to a person within its
jurisdiction, and the necessary and foreseeable consequence is
that that person's rights under the Covenant will be violated in
another jurisdiction, the State party itself may be in violation of
the Covenant ....The foreseeability of the consequence would
mean that there was a present violation by the State party,
even
1 35
though the consequence would not occur until later on.
The Committee further held in the Ng views that a "real risk" of
violation can exist, even if the individual has not yet been convicted of a capital
crime, if the imposition of the death penalty ap36
likely.
pears
In the Kindler views, the UNHRC found that Canada had not
violated its obligations under the ICCPR' 37 for four reasons.
First, the Committee found that extradition to face the death penalty for premeditated murder did not violate the Article 6(1) right
to life because Article 6(2) expressly permits the imposition of the
death penalty for "the most serious crimes., 138 Second, the
Committee found that, in light of the Article 6(2) exception, the
death penalty itself did not constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment in violation of Article 7.139 Third, although Canada had abolished the death penalty and should consider the attitudes of its citizens when determining whether or not to
seek assurances that the death penalty will not be imposed, it was
not obligated to seek such assurances in all cases." In Kindler's
case, legitimate reasons justifying the decision not to seek assurances included the absence of exceptional circumstances mitigating
against the imposition of the death penalty, the availability in the
United States of due process to challenge the death sentence, and

134.

Kindler Views, supra note 106,

7. Apparently, the Committee felt that neither

petitioner had presented sufficient evidence to support his other claims.
135. Id., J 6.2.
136. Ng Views, supra note 130,
13.5.
137. Kindler Views, supra note 106, J 18.
138. Id., 1 14.3.
139. Id., 1 15.1 (stating that the ICCPR must be read as a whole, so that the Article
6(2) exception is relevant to the definition of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment).
140. Id., J 14.5.
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the importance of preventing Canada from becoming a safe haven
for capital criminals from the United States.' 4 ' Finally, the Committee found that the "death row phenomenon" did not violate
Article 7 of the Covenant. 42 The Committee reaffirmed an earlier statement that "prolonged periods of detention under a severe
custodial regime on death row cannot generally be considered to
constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment if the convicted
person is merely availing himself of appellate remedies."'43 Although the Committee recognized the validity of the Soering decision, it limited the decision closely to its facts. The Committee distinguished Kindler's case on the grounds of his age and mental
state, the conditions of confinement on death row in Pennsylvania-about which Kindler had made no specific submissions-and
the lack of an alternative jurisdiction in which Kindler could be
brought to justice.' Thus, the Committee concluded that Canada had not violated its obligations to Kindler under the
ICCPR. 45
In the Ng views, on the other hand, the Committee found
that execution by gas asphyxiation violated the Article 7 prohibition against cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment.' The
Committee cited its General Comment on Article 7 in holding that
the death penalty must be carried out both in accordance with the
provisions of Article 6(2) and "in such a way as to cause the least
possible physical and mental suffering."'"

Because of the agony

that an individual endures during the gas asphyxiation procedure,
which can last over ten minutes, the Committee found that execution by gas asphyxiation failed to meet the "least possible suffer-

141. Id., 1 14.6.
142. Article 7 states: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment." ICCPR, supra note 55, art. 7; Kindler Views, supra

note 106,
15.2.
143. Kindler Views, supra note 106,

15.2 (quoting Martin v. Jamaica, Comm. No.

317/1988, Views of the UN Human Rights Committee, adopted on 24 March 1993,

12.2).
144. Kindler Views, supra note 106, [ 15.3.
145. Id.,
18.
146. Ng Views, supra note 130, 16.4.
147. I&,
16.2 (quoting
CCPR/C/21/Add.3, para. 6).

General

Comment

20[44]

on

Article

7,

UN

Doc.
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ing" standard and thus violated Article 7.148
Consequently,
49
Canada's extradition of Ng violated the ICCPR1
The Ng views, however, were not unanimous.' Four members of the Committee dissented to the Article 6 findings. They
argued that Article 6(2) did not apply to countries that had abolished the death penalty, so that these States are obligated under
Article 6 to refuse extradition of capital criminals unless assurances are provided. In addition, four members of the Committee
disagreed with the Article 7 finding on the ground that there was
insufficient evidence that execution by gas asphyxiation was more
cruel and inhuman than other methods of execution.
Both the Canadian Supreme Court and UNHRC Kindler
decisions demonstrate that international human rights obligations
will not, in all circumstances, prevent States from extraditing individuals to face the death penalty. The "safe haven" possibility
apparently is perceived as a real threat,' and has a significant
impact on the willingness of national courts and international human rights bodies to require States to refuse requests to extradite
capital fugitives. In addition, the UNHRC's reiteration of the principle that death row delays attributable to the prosecution of prisoner appeals do not constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment reveals the extent to which international, as opposed to
regional, consensus on the death penalty is lacking. 52 Nonetheless, the Ng views indicate that some measure of agreement exists
at the international level against the imposition of the death penalty through cruel and degrading means. Ng also shows that a
State's interests in avoiding the "safe haven" threat will not always
override the State's international human rights obligations.
Furthermore, the UNHRC Ng case also raises the issue of
compliance with international human rights obligations. In that
case, despite the UNHRC's request that Canada stay Ng's extradition pending the Committee's consideration of his case, Canada
extradited Ng on the same day that the Canadian Supreme Court

148. Ng Views, supra note 130,

149.

l,

16.4.

17.

150. See id., Appendix, for individual views.

151. But see supra notes 122 and 127 and accompanying text (questioning the validity
of the "safe haven" argument).

152. The lack of consensus at the international level is also apparent in the Ng dissents. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.

1995]

ARBITRARINESS AND THE DEATH PENALTY

639

dismissed his appeal. 53 Thus, Ng was unable to benefit from the
protection to which he was entitled under the ICCPR. However,
although compliance with UNHRC views remains essentially voluntary, 54 the existence of an authoritative interpretation of the
ICCPR that obligates States not to extradite individuals to face
death by gas asphyxiation may still have two important effects.
First, the decision will make it more difficult for Canada and other
States party to the ICCPR to extradite without assurances in future cases similar to Ng's because they may thereby incur international political disfavor. Second, the Ng views on death by gas
asphyxiation will enhance the political clout of States seeking assurances against the imposition of the death penalty by that method because such States can refer to an authoritative international
opinion to support their objections.
D. Summary
The above cases demonstrate that a significant portion of the
international community is moving, admittedly with some reservations, toward the point where international human rights obligations will require many States to refuse to extradite individuals to
the United States to face capital prosecution. It is now clearly
established that States' human rights obligations apply to extradition decisions and obligate States to refuse to extradite individuals
who face a significant risk of being subjected to cruel and inhuman punishment in the receiving State. 5 If the harboring State
has acceded to a treaty that requires the abolition of the death
penalty, 56 the death penalty per se will constitute cruel and inhuman punishment to which the State may not subject anyone
through extradition.5 7 Even if a State is not obligated by treaty
to abolish the death penalty, certain incidents of the administration
of the death penalty, such as prolonged detention in harsh conditions on death row5 8 or the method of execution, 59 may be
153. Ng Views, supra note 130, T 2.5.
154. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.

155. See supra notes 79, 98-100, 135-36 and accompanying text; see also Craig R.
Roecks, Extradition, Human Rights, and the Death Penalty: When Nations Must Refuse to
Extradite a Person Charged with a Capital Crime, 25 CAL W. INT'L L.J. 189, 217 (1994).

156.
157.
158.
159.

See, e.g., Sixth Protocol, supra note 89.
See supra text accompanying note 98.
See supra notes 82--84 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 146-48.
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deemed sufficiently cruel and inhuman to obligate the State to refuse extradition of anyone facing a significant risk of receiving a
death sentence.
Canadian officials, whose extradition policies are likely to
have the most significant impact in the United States because of
Canada's proximity to and long border with the United States,
have exhibited some reluctance to condition extradition on assurances that the death penalty will not be carried out. However,
several factors suggest that this reluctance may dissipate in the
near future. First, there were strong dissents to the Canadian Supreme Court decisions permitting extradition to face the death
penalty,16° and several commentators have criticized the Canadian Court's analysis of the application of the Canadian Charter to
extradition proceedings. 6' Second, the persuasiveness of a crucial
argument supporting the Canadian Court's decisions, the "safe
haven" argument, is debatable. The United States has demonstrated that it will provide, when necessary to obtain extradition,
assurances that the death penalty will not be imposed. 62 Thus,
captial fugitives are unlikely to elude justice if assurances are
demanded. Moreover, fugitives probably flee the country in an attempt to escape punishment altogether, not merely to reduce the
punishment they will receive. Thus, a regular Canadian practice of
requesting assurances in extradition cases involving capital fugitives
should not lead to an increase of criminal flight to Canada over
other jurisdictions. Third, the UNHRC specifically has addressed
Canada's obligations in this context since the Canadian Supreme
Court decisions. Although the UNHRC held that Canada was not
obligated in all cases to refuse to extradite individuals to face the
death penalty, 63 the Committee also held that Canada's human
rights obligations do apply to extradition decisions and obligate
Canada to investigate conditions in receiving States and to refuse
to extradite if those conditions constitute cruel and inhuman, punishment. 16 Furthermore, although Canadian officials refused to

160. See supra notes 120-27 and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., John Pak, Canadian Extradition and the Death Penalty: Seeking a Constitutional Assurance of Life, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 239 (1993); Sharon A. Williams,
Extradition to a State That Imposes the Death Penalty, 1990 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 117.
162. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 140-41.
164. See supra text accompanying note 135. This principle directly contradicts the

Canadian Supreme Court's interpretation of the State's responsibility for punishments that
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postpone the extraditions of Kindler and Ng until after the
UNHRC reviewed their cases, Canada will have greater difficulty
disregarding its international human rights obligations now that
those obligations have been stated clearly by the UNHRC. For
these reasons, there is a strong possibility that Canada's interpretation of its obligations in the extradition context will shift in the
future, and Canada will begin to condition extradition on assurances that the death penalty will not be imposed.
Thus, the international decisions demonstrate that, despite
U.S. Supreme Court statements to the contrary, 165 the U.S. criminal justice system can no longer remain isolated from the international community. The administration of the death penalty will be
subject to international scrutiny, and when extradition of capital
criminals is sought, decisions regarding capital prosecutions may be
affected by the judgments that such international scrutiny yields.
III. ARBrrRARiNESS AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION CONTEXT

The administration of the death penalty in the existing international context is unconstitutional because it fails to satisfy either
component of the Supreme Court's procedural requirements for
the penalty's constitutional imposition. A decision to forego capital
prosecution to facilitate extradition of an accused individual from a
harboring State that opposes the death penalty is not based upon
any factor related to the accused's character or the characteristics
of his crime. Furthermore, when death penalty decisions are influenced by a factor unrelated to the defendant or his crime, the
evenhanded and consistent imposition of the death penalty is compromised.
Admittedly, a particular defendant's constitutional right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment is not violated when that
defendant is involved in an extradition proceeding though which
the harboring State's international human rights obligations affect

take place after extradition. See supra text accompanying note 114.
165. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989) ("We emphasize that [in
determining whether a particular application of the death penalty violates evolving standards of decency] it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive, rejecting the
contention of petitioners and their various amici

other countries are relevant.").

. . .

that the sentencing practices of
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the prosecution of the defendant. Such a defendant escapes capital
punishment, and the Supreme Court explicitly has held that
[n]othing in any of our cases suggests that the decision to afford
an individual defendant mercy violates the Constitution. Furman
held only that ... the decision to impose it had to be guided by
standards so that the sentencing authority would focus on1 the
particularized circumstances of the crime and the defendant. 6
Nonetheless, the death penalty system as a whole is administered
in an arbitrary and unconstitutional manner when the international
political system within which it operates clearly imposes on participating States an obligation, in certain circumstances, to coercively
influence death penalty decisions. In such a system, every affirmative decision to impose the death penalty would be different except for the nonexistence-or the existence of the lack-of a single
extrinsic factor unrelated to the defendant's character or crime.
Thus, every such affirmative death penalty decision is tainted by
the influence of that extrinsic, and constitutionally impermissible,
factor.
A hypothetical illustration from a different context may help
to clarify the assertion. Suppose that a group of defendants are
tried for capital offenses under a death penalty statute similar to
the Georgia statute upheld in Gregg v. Georgia.67 All the defendants tried for capital offenses are African-American. Not all the
defendants tried receive the death penalty; those that do are sentenced by juries that (1) affirmatively found a statutory aggravating circumstance, (2) considered all aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, and (3) determined that those circumstances
weighed in favor of sentencing the defendants to death. Thus, all
affirmative decisions to impose the death penalty were guided by
the statutes, and each death penalty sentence was based not on
race, but on the proper consideration of relevant factors. However,
suppose further that the reason that no white defendants were
charged with capital crimes, and that all the defendants sentenced
to death happened to be African-American," is that in each

166. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976) (emphasis added).
167. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
168. Obviously, this hypothetical unrealistically divides all defendants into only two
races. This is done for the sole purpose of keeping the hypothetical simple and does not
stem from a lack of awareness of the much more diverse racial makeup of American

society.
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white defendant's case, the prosecutor made the constitutionally
permissible decision to "afford [that] individual defendant mercy.''169 Furthermore, suppose that the decision to afford mercy
was based on the fact that the defendant was white. In such a
case, one would not hesitate to recognize that the system as a
whole, and thus each affirmative death penalty decision made
within the system, is tainted by consideration of the race of the
defendant-a factor that is universally recognized as an impermissible consideration in death penalty decisions." Although each
death sentence, examined individually, appears to have been imposed in accordance with the procedural safeguards required under
the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the examination of the entire process reveals that the race of the defendants
sentenced to death in fact played an unconstitutional role in their
individual sentencing decisions because their nonwhiteness diminished the chances that they would be afforded mercy.
Similarly, the fact that defendants who flee to anti-death penalty States can escape capital prosecution has an impermissible
influence on affirmative death sentances imposed on defendants
who do not flee. Of the entire pool of defendants that might be
subjected to capital prosecution, every defendant who actually
faces capital charges does so partly because of her failure to flee
to a State opposed to the death penalty. In other words, some
defendants are eliminated from the pool of those facing capital
prosecution because they have fled to a State that requires such
elimination as a condition for extradition; those that remain in the
pool do so partly because they failed to flee to such a State. Thus,
the capital defendant's failure to flee affirmatively contributes to
the imposition of the death penalty. Because this "failure to flee"
circumstance is not related to the defendant's character" l or
crime, and it is not permissibly a consideration in death penalty

169. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199.
170. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309 n.30 (1987) (listing Supreme Court
cases intended to eradicate racial prejudice from criminal proceedings, including capital
sentencing procedures).
171. One might legitimately argue that whether or not one flees the country after
committing a capital crime does reflect on one's character. However, flight most likely
signifies a lack of remorse for the crime, which properly should be an aggravating circumstance. Because flight in fact operates as a "mitigating" circumstance and prevents a
defendant from receiving the death penalty, the influence of the "failure to flee" factor
on death penalty decisions cannot be excused as the permissible influence of a facet of
the defendant's character.
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decisions.172 Its influence, therefore, renders the death penalty
system unconstitutional.
The "failure to flee" factor, although extrinsic to the defendant's character and crime, admittedly is not as inflammatory or
objectionable on its face as the racial factor described in the above
hypothetical. However, when one considers that the factors that
are likely to contribute to a defendant's decision to flee the country or not-access to funds, availability of a passport, and the
awareness that flight could enable the defendant to avoid the
death penalty-are closely linked to a defendant's class and level
of education, the objectionable nature of the influence of that
decision on the defendant's chances of being sentenced to death
becomes more apparent.
Some additional criticisms of the assertion that the death
penalty is unconstitutional should be addressed. First, defendants
within the United States sometimes receive different punishments
for similar crimes because of the rather arbitrary fact that the
crimes were committed in different states. Because the Constitution assigns primary responsibility for criminal punishment to the
states,173 states are free to assign punishments different from
those assigned in other states for the same crimes. Yet the Supreme Court has never held that a punishment, including the
death penalty, imposed in one state is arbitrary because it is more
severe than that which could have been imposed in another state.
However, the failure of the Supreme Court to object to the
uneven imposition of punishments across state lines within the
United States does not undermine the argument presented here.
The Constitution simply does not require evenhanded punishments across state lines; rather, it allows each state, within the
constraints of the Eighth Amendment, to determine appropriate
criminal punishments. The Supreme Court has held, however, that
the Constitution requires the evenhanded administration of the
death penalty within any state that has chosen to impose the penalty. 7 This Note argues that such evenhanded administration,
within a particular state, is compromised by the influence of ex-

172. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.

173. See U.S. CONST. art. I (enumerating limited powers granted to Congress); U.S.
CONST. amend. X (reserving powers not granted to Congress to the states).

174. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976); supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.

1995]

ARBITRARINESS AND THE DEATH PENALTY

645

trinsic factors in the international extradition context. The death

penalty is not arbitrary because people in other countries are not
subject to it; rather, it is arbitrary because international opposition
to the death penalty impermissibly affects the administration of the

penalty within each state that has chosen to impose it. 75 This argument has never arisen in the domestic context because the fact

that some states refuse to impose the death penalty cannot affect
the administration of the death penalty within the other states.
The Constitution obligates states to extradite to other states "on

Demand of the executive Authority of the State."'76 Thus, a
state cannot constitutionally refuse to extradite because it opposes
the use of the death penalty, and differing state views on the

penalty cannot affect the administration of the penalty within the
states that impose it.
A second objection might be that because discretionary decisionmaking arguably is inherent in the criminal justice system,

occasional anomalous cases like those in which foreign States'
human rights obligations affect death penalty decisions are not

unacceptable. However, although the Supreme Court has indicated
a willingness to tolerate some discretionary inconsistencies in death

penalty decisions,'

it also has stated that "[t]he Constitution is

not offended by inconsistency in results based on the objective

circumstances of the crime." 78 The implication of the Court's
qualification is that inconsistencies based on some factor other
than the objective circumstances of the crime will offend the Con-

stitution. Thus, sentencing disparities based on whether or not the
defendant fled to a State opposed to the death penalty render the

administration of the death penalty inconsistent with the require-

175. It is appropriate to attribute the effects of international human rights obligations
on the administration of the death penalty to all states that impose it because the U.S.
government negotiates the extradition treaties that allow harboring States to require assurances that the death penalty will not be imposed, and states always must seek extradition through the U.S. Department of State.
176. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2 ("A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State,
shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.").
177. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987) ("Where the discretion
that is fundamental to our criminal process is involved, we decline to assume that what
is unexplained is invidious."); see also id. at 312 n.35 ("No one contends that all sentencing disparities can be eliminated.").
178. Id. at 307 n.28 (emphasis added).
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ments of the Constitution. Moreover, the Court has stated that the
severe and irreversible nature of the death penalty makes the
influence of impermissible factors on death penalty decisions particularly reprehensible.'79 Therefore, discretionary inconsistencies
that may be tolerated in criminal sentencing in general are unacceptable in the context of the death penalty.
Finally, and perhaps most persuasively, one might argue that
because the types of extradition incidents described here occur so
infrequently,18 the impact on the death penalty system as a
whole is so minimal that one cannot argue that the entire system
is rendered arbitrary. The response to this objection is twofold.
First, such cases may become more frequent as States' obligations
to refuse extradition are clarified, 1 awareness of the possibility
of escaping capital punishment through flight increases," and
technological advances lead to increased international travel. It is
useful to anticipate the effect that such an increase in the occurrence of these extradition cases will have on the administration of
the death penalty in the United States. Second, regardless of the
limited de facto influence that international human rights obligations presently have on death penalty decisions, the description of
that influence remains significant. The illustration of how international human rights obligations affect all death penalty decisions
reveals how decisions not to seek the death penalty are relevant to
determining whether the death penalty on the whole is administered fairly. Consequently, the argument challenges the Supreme
Court's view, expressed in McCleskey v. Kemp, that courts should
presume that death penalty decisions are fair absent proof of the

179. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (Stewart,
ring); id at 311-12 (White, J., concurring).
180.

J., concur-

The four cases discussed herein appear to be the only-or at least the only well-

publicized-instances in which the possible imposition of the death penalty became an
issue in extradition proceedings. Moreover, unlike the hypothetical race example in which
all white defendants were excluded from capital prosecution, international human rights
obligations do not operate to exclude all or only wealthy, well-educated defendants from

capital prosecution.
181. See Parkerson & Stoehr, supra note 101, at 72-76 (arguing that the conflict between European and U.S. attitudes toward the death penalty and the principles enunciat-

ed in the Soering and Short cases pose a significant threat to the exercise of U.S. jurisdiction over capital cases involving U.S. military personnel stationed in NATO countries).
182. See Roecks, supra note 155, at 232 (arguing that as capital criminals become
aware of the possibility of avoiding the death penalty by fleeing to a State opposed to

the death penalty, death penalty opponents will develop an "underground railroad" to
smuggle fugitives).
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influence of invidious decisional factors at the sentencing stage of
a particular defendant's capital trial. 83 The analysis here suggests
that courts must be willing to examine the system of capital punishment as a whole to determine whether impermissible factors
bear upon who ultimately is sentenced to death. If such an examination reveals that impermissible factors influence the makeup of
the pool of defendants that is subjected to otherwise constitutional
capital sentencing procedures, courts must be willing to hold that,
despite what "most of the public seems to desire, and the Constitution appears to permit,"'" the death penalty is administered
unfairly and is thus unconstitutional.
The demonstration of the influence of an extrinsic factor in
the international extradition context is also significant for another
reason: It provides a framework for understanding the inevitability
of the influence of other extrinsic factors on death penalty
decisionmaking. The example presented here shows that the criminal justice system operates within a larger context-the international political community-and that efforts to insulate decisions
made within the criminal justice system from the influence of
irrelevant factors engendered by the surrounding context are futile.
Thus, prosecutors in the United States cannot prevent international
human rights obligations from influencing death penalty decisions
because they have no control over foreign officials, who are
free-and perhaps even obligated-to refuse extradition unless
provided with assurances that the death penalty will not be imposed.
The international extradition example can be extended by
analogy to demonstrate the unavoidable influence of extrinsic
factors from other surrounding contexts that affect the criminal
justice system. Because actors within the criminal justice system
generally cannot control the behavior of actors outside the system,
the system cannot insulate itself from the effects of the behavior
of those other actors any more than it can insulate itself from
actions taken by foreign officials. Thus, the influence of external
183. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 319 ("It is the ultimate duty of courts to determine on a
case-by-case basis whether these laws are applied consistently with the Constitution. Despite McCleskey's wide-ranging arguments that basically challenge the validity of capital
punishment in our multiracial society, the only question before us is whether in his
case . . . the law of Georgia was properly applied.") (emphasis added).

184. Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1131 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
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societal factors on death penalty decisions is equally as unavoidable as the influence of international human rights obligations, and
the arbitrariness of the administration of the death penalty is inevitable.
In fact, courts and legislatures generally recognize that the
criminal justice system is not insulated from its surrounding societal context, and accept the influence that societal factors have on
the administration of justice. However, in the context of the death
penalty, a uniquely severe punishment, 85 courts presume that
decisionmaking can be insulated from external factors. The demonstrated influence of international human rights obligations and the
analogy it provides for understanding the influence of extrinsic
factors engendered in other contexts exposes the fallacy of that
presumption. Hopefully, it will provide the impetus for a greater
recognition on the part of courts and legislatures alike that the arbitrariness of the death penalty is inevitable and that, therefore,
the death penalty cannot be administered in accordance with our
Constitution.
CONCLUSION

This Note examines the emerging willingness of members of
the international community to act on their opposition to the
death penalty by refusing to extradite anyone who faces a substantial likelihood of being sentenced to death. This international response to the United States' persistent use of the death penalty
impermissibly influences the administration of the death penalty in
the United States and renders death penalty decisions arbitrary
and capricious, and thus unconstitutional.
Admittedly, this argument is not likely to lead to a judicial
determination that the death penalty as presently administered is
arbitrary and capricious at a systematic level. Because international
human rights obligations only infrequently operate through extradition proceedings to alter prosecutorial decisions to seek the death
penalty, the impact that international obligations have on the
death penalty system as a whole is not readily apparent. Nonetheless, the argument still may serve two important purposes. First, it
demonstrates the extent to which decisions made before capital
trials take place can affect the fairness of individual, affirmative
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capital sentencing decisions. This should prompt both courts and
legislatures to reexamine the administration of the death penalty
as a whole and reconsider whether death penalty statutes that
merely guide jury discretion in the context of individual sentencing
decisions adequately protect against the arbitrary imposition of the
death penalty. Second, when conducting this proposed re-analysis
of the administration of the death penalty, courts and legislatures
should recognize from the international extradition example that
factors unrelated to the characteristics of capital defendants or
their crimes inevitably influence death penalty decisions. Thus,
because the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution, informed by
"evolving standards of decency, ' 1 6 cannot abide the arbitrary
imposition of the death penalty that inexorably results when factors unrelated to defendants or their crimes influence the decisionmaking process, the nation "eventually [should] conclude that the
effort to eliminate arbitrariness while preserving fairness 'in the
infliction of [death] is so plainly doomed to failure that it-and
the death penalty-must be abandoned altogether.""'
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